

ACER Decision on Core ID CCM: Annex II

**The third amendment ~~o~~f the intraday capacity
calculation methodology of the Core capacity
calculation region**

in accordance with Articles 20ff. of the Commission Regulation (EU)
2015/1222 of 24th July 2015 establishing a guideline on capacity allocation
and congestion management

~~19-01-2023~~

14 March 2024

Whereas

TSOs of the Core CCR (“Core TSOs”), taking into account the following:

- (1) Based on further developments and alignments with Core NRAs after the decision by the Agency in 21st February 2019, Core TSOs deemed it necessary to introduce the following changes.
- (2) The Intraday process is subject to constrained timings. Core TSOs identified the need to validate the outcome of the IDCC process during an ATC based validation step in addition to the CNEC based validation. The validation step could identify ATC which are too high and jeopardize grid security. These calculated ATCs can then be reduced by the validating TSO during the ATC validation step, as long as an ATC extraction will be performed from the Flow-Based domains resulting from the final computation.
- (3) The following changes fulfil the objectives set out in Article 3 CACM.
- (4) The introduction of an ATC based validation step will further increase the operational security as set out in Article 3 (c) CACM by allowing to make sure that grid security is maintained with the ATCs given to the market.

Article 1
Amendments concerning the introduction of an ATC validation step

The previous Article 21. ~~Calculation~~ 'Calculation of ATCs for SIDC fallback ~~procedure~~procedure' shall become Article 20 and shall be amended accordingly:

~~In paragraph 3 letter (d)~~Paragraph 4(c) shall be added and be read accordingly:

“An ATC limitation on specific borders as set by relevant TSOs as output of the local validation as defined in Annex 6 $ATC_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}}$ ”

In paragraph 5 letter (cc)(v) shall be replaced and be read accordingly:

“ \overrightarrow{ATC}_k is limited to a maximum value of $ATC_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}}$ if such value has been introduced by TSOs on the border $A \rightarrow B$ as a result of the ATC validation phase as described in Annex 6. Then go back to step i”

Article 2
Introduction of a new Annex 6

A new Annex 6: ‘ATC based validation process’ shall be introduced and be read accordingly:

“

1. Each Core TSO has the right to perform an ATC based validation in order to ensure operational security. This is an additional process, next to the existing validation process described in Article ~~19~~18 as IVA validation. Pursuant to this validation, each Core TSO can set a maximum ATC value for its own oriented border.
2. The ID ATC on a bidding zone border shall always be the lowest value of all ID ATCs set by all TSOs for this bidding zone border.

$$ATC_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}} = \min(\overrightarrow{ATC}_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}, TSO 1}, \overrightarrow{ATC}_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}, TSO 2}, \overrightarrow{ATC}_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}, TSO x})$$

Equation 16

with

$ATC_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}}$	Minimum of validated ATCs for border $A \rightarrow B$ by all Core TSOs adjacent to this border
$\overrightarrow{ATC}_{A \rightarrow B \text{ validated}, TSO x}$	Validated ATC for border $A \rightarrow B$ by TSO x

3. The ATC limitation may be done only in the following situations:

- (a) an occurrence of an unexpected contingency impacting a CNE after the beginning of the related IDCC process;
- (b) as a fallback, in case IVA validation cannot be performed fully in time or if it faces IT issue; or
- (c) a mistake in input data that leads to an overestimation of cross-zonal capacity from an operational system security perspective.

~~3.4.~~ In addition to the publication described in Article ~~23~~22, Core TSOs and the CCC shall publish at least the following information and data items with regard to the ATC based validation for each IDCC MTU:

- (a) The TSO invoking the limitation;
- (b) The ATC limitation per border;
- (c) The situation applicable as per the previous paragraph; and
- ~~(e)~~(d) The detailed reason for the limitation of the ATC with the same level of information as IVA validation following the reasonings developed in Article 19-18(2) of the CCM), including the operational security limits (when relevant) that would have been violated without the reductions, and under which circumstances they would have been violated.

Every three months, the CCC, with the support of Core TSOs where relevant, shall provide in the quarterly report the ~~following~~ data items given under paragraph 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d), with regard to the ATC based validation for each IDCC MTU:

- ~~The TSO invoking the limitation~~
- ~~The ATC limitation per border~~
- ~~The detailed reason for the limitation of the ATC following the reasonings developed in article 19 (2) of the CCM~~

”