ACER finds serious shortcomings in ENTSO-E’ s electricity network plans – underlining the need for current TEN-E reforms to strengthen independent project assessments

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ACER finds serious shortcomings in ENTSO-E’ s electricity network plans – underlining the need for current TEN-E reforms to strengthen independent project assessments

What’s the ACER Opinion on ENTSO-E’s draft electricity 2020 network plan about?

​​Every 2 years, ACER provides an opinion on the draft grid plans (called Ten-Year Network Development Plans or TYNDPs) proposed by the network operators.

In its Opinions on the draft 2020 plans, ACER finds that the electricity and gas plans (developed by ENTSO-E and ENTSOG respectively) do not sufficiently contribute to the efficient market due to several shortcomings. With respect to electricity, in ACER's view:​

  • The TYNDP core building blocks such as scenarios development, infrastructure needs identification and cost-benefit analysis (CBA) implementation need to be improved. There are also shortcomings in public consultations on key elements of the methodologies used for the assessment of the energy projects being proposed by network operators.

  • A number of shortcomings could be remedied by legislators in the current TEN-E reforms by strengthening the independent assessment of projects and the regulatory oversight of network operators. ACER has previously pointed to risks of lack of neutrality of the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs) and the need for step changes in TEN-E governance to avoid conflict of interests while ensuring transparency.

See also the ACER Opinion on the ENTSOG gas network plan​.​

Shortcomings could be remedied by improving the TEN-E Regulation

The EU framework for energy infrastructure needs to be robust for cost-efficient cross-border projects which are best for the energy transition.

ACER believes that the shortcomings of the TYNDP process as can be remedied by improving the TEN-E investment framework in line with the European Green Deal. To this end, regulators (through ACER and CEER) issued two position papers, one in March 20​21 and one in June 202​​0 on how to improve the revision of TEN-E Regulation including on infrastructure development governance.

ACER has called on the European co-legislators to consider the regulators' proposals as a solution to promote a neutral technical assessment of infrastructure projects in line with the European Green Deal, avoiding risks of unjustified costs to European consumers.

For example, currently the transmission system operators (TSOs), through the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs), develop the scenarios to assess projects in different futures. TSOs can be perceived as biased towards favouring more infrastructure as it is in their interest. The neutrality of scenarios and the credibility of the TYNDP process can thus be compromised. To safeguard neutrality, regulators have proposed the introduction of ACER framework guidelines for TYNDP scenarios for the ENTSOs to follow. This has been taken up in the European Commission's legislative proposals but should be further strengthened and streamlined, as suggested by regulators.

Europe's energy regulators have pointed to the need for strengthened regulatory scrutiny over the ENTSO's to safeguard the public interest, for ACER to be given the powers to approve the methodologies for the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBAs) and to issue binding guidelines to the ENTSOs for the TYNDP development.

What are ACER's key findings of the 2020 draft electricity TYNDP?

ACER has issued two Opinions on the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) TYNDP 2020, one on methodological aspects of the electricity TYNDP 2020 and one on the TYNDP projects.

The ACER Opinions are addressed to ENTSO-E, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.

What are the key improvements in the 2020 draft electricity TYNDP?

The ACER Opinions acknowledge that the TYNDP process is complex and resource intensive, and needs to be carried out within a two-year timeframe. For the elec​tricity TYNDP, ACER welcomes a number of improvements for instance in the so-called Inclusion Guidelines, the data collection process, the needs identification, and the transparency of the CBA assessment.

What are the key shortcomings of the 2020 draft electricity TYNDP?

ACER's opinion notes limited improvements and evolution of the draft plan in comparison to previous TYNDP and identifies 4 main shortcomings:

  1. Delays of scenario development process and lack of data release which compromised the integrity of the TYNDP.

  2. Unbalanced CBA due to the missing, non-traceable Current Trends scenario.

  3. Lack of CBA analysis after the study year 2030.

  4. Poor and insufficient consultations of the scenarios methodology and of the needs methodology.

​​In ACER's opinion the draft electricity TYNDP 2020 does not sufficiently contribute to the objective of efficient functioning of the market.

What does ACER recommend for improving future electricity TYNDPs?

ACER encourages the ENTSOs to address the remaining shortcomings and stands ready to provide guidance or clarifications where needed. ACER proposes several recommendations to ENTSO-E in pursuit of an efficient, further integrated and transparent network planning to serve European consumers and Europe's decarbonisation and sector integration ambitions:

For the Final Electricity TYNDP 2020

  1. Provide the storyline and full data for the missing Current Trends scenario.

  2. Publish the baseline capacities per border as used in the starting grid for the needs exercise and in the reference grids for the CBA calculations.

  3. Include a Benefit / Cost ratio and Net Present Value calculation for all projects for each of the four scenarios.

For the Electricity TYNDP 2022 and beyond

  1. Restructure the scenario development process in order to be completed by December of the year before the TYNDP.

  2. Involve relevant stakeholders and experts in the development of scenario assumptions.

  3. Ensure transparency of scenario development and availability of scenario data. All scenarios should be used in the needs exercise and the CBA analysis in a balanced way, using the premise of economic growth.

  4. Early and substantial consultation of the needs methodology (including important parameters like the horizons to be studied, the zones modelling, the climatic years to be used).

  5. Define an appropriate starting network for the needs identification.

  6. Duly implement the provisions of the TYNDP Inclusion Guidelines - non-compliant projects should be excluded.

  7. Consider the impact of the 70% minimum interconnection capacity target in the modelling of the power system, where relevant.

  8. Transfer capacities should be calculated for all projects and with more granularity and transparency.

  9. Consult the main elements of the TYNDP CBA (e.g. study horizons, criteria for the construction of the reference grid, scope of the CBA) before the inclusion of projects in the future TYNDP.

  10. Build the reference grid considered for the CBA analysis, according to the Agency's recommendations.

  11. ENTSO-E should extend the study horizons for which a CBA analysis is conducted for the TYNDP 2022 at least to one study year after 2030 (e.g. 2035 or 2040).

What is the TYNDP?

The main objectives of the TYNDP are to:​

  • identify investment gaps (including cross border capacities

  • contribute to a sufficient and non-discriminatory level of cross-border interconnections, the effective competition and the efficient functioning of the market, and

  • ensure a greater transparency of the European electricity transmission network.

​The TYNDP builds on national investment plans prepared by the transmission system operators (TSOs) and takes into account the regional investment plans, published every two years.

Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) are selected from the TYNDP via a separate process led by the European Commission. The TYNDP should provide essential and comprehensive information for the selection of PCIs, in particular through complete, monetised, and reliable cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and assessment of projects.

What is the role of ACER and its overall assessment?

ACER issues an opinion on the draft network plan developed by network operators taking into account the objectives of non-discrimination, effective competition, and the efficient and secure functioning of the internal electricity market.

ACER finds serious shortcomings in ENTSOG's gas network plans – underlining the need for current TEN-E reforms to strengthen independent project assessments

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ACER finds serious shortcomings in ENTSOG's gas network plans – underlining the need for current TEN-E reforms to strengthen independent project assessments

What’s the ACER Opinion on ENTSOG’s draft gas 2020 network plan about?

Every 2 years, ACER provides a non-binding opinion on the draft grid plans (called Ten-Year Network Development Plans or TYNDPs) proposed by the network operators.

In its Opinions on the draft 2020 plans, ACER finds that the electricity and gas plans (developed by ENTSO-E and ENTSOG respectively) do not sufficiently contribute to the efficient market due to several shortcomings. With respect to gas,​ in ACER's view:

  • Too many conventional gas projects - close to €75 billion – are proposed by network operators and not all are assessed by ENTSOG. Despite ongoing efforts, the framework also fails to properly assess the contribution of gas projects to sustainability.
  • The TYNDP core building blocks need to be improved such as scenarios development and cost-benefit analysis (CBA). There are also shortcomings in public consultations with stakeholders on key elements of the energy projects being proposed by network operators.
  • A number of shortcomings could be remedied by legislators in the current TEN-E reforms by strengthening the independent assessment of projects and the regulatory oversight of network operators. ACER has previously pointed to risks of lack of neutrality of the two European Networks of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs) and the need for step changes in TEN-E governance to avoid conflict of interests while ensuring transparency.

See also the ACER Opinion on the ENTSO-E electricity network plan.​

Shortcomings could be remedied by improving the TEN-E Regulation

The EU framework for energy infrastructure needs to be robust for cost-efficient cross-border projects which are best for the energy transition.

ACER believes that the shortcomings of the TYNDP process as can be remedied by improving the TEN-E investment framework in line with the European Green Deal. To this end, regulators (ACER and CEER) issued two position papers, one in March 2021 and one in June 2020​ on how to improve the revision of TEN-E Regulation including on infrastructure development governance.

ACER has called on the European co-legislators to consider the regulators' proposals as a solution to promote a neutral technical assessment of infrastructure projects in line with the European Green Deal, avoiding risks of unjustified costs to European consumers.

For example, currently the transmission system operators (TSOs), through the European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSOs), develop the scenarios to assess projects in different futures. TSOs can be perceived as biased towards favouring more infrastructure as it is in their interest. The neutrality of scenarios and the credibility of the TYNDP process can thus be compromised. To safeguard neutrality, regulators have proposed the introduction of ACER framework guidelines for TYNDP scenarios for the ENTSOs to follow. This has been taken up in the European Commission's legislative proposals but should be further strengthened and streamlined, as suggested by regulators.

Europe's energy regulators have pointed to the need for strengthened regulatory scrutiny over the ENTSO's to safeguard the public interest, for ACER to be given the powers to approve the methodologies for the Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBAs) which are used to assess projects, and to issue binding guidelines to the ENTSOs for the TYNDP development.

What are ACER's key findings of the 2020 draft gas TYNDP?

ACER has issued an Opinion on the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG) TYNDP 2020 for gas. The ACER Opinion is addressed to ENTSOG, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council.

ACER finds that the draft gas TYNDP 2020 follows a similar methodology as previous editions.

What are the key improvements in the 2020 draft gas TYNDP?

ACER's opinion notes limited improvements and evolution of the draft plan in comparison to previous TYNDP. Improvements are mainly limited to a better presentation of results and for the first time, the inclusion of a heterogeneous category of projects addressing the energy transition. ACER concurs with ENTSOG that current gas infrastructure in Europe is resilient, near to the completion of the internal gas market and that the limited infrastructure investment gaps will be closed in the next five years by projects already currently under development.

What are the key shortcomings of the 2020 draft gas TYNDP?

ACER regrets that the TYNDP includes a broad investment portfolio of conventional gas projects close to € 75 billion, clearly exceeding reasonable needs, in view of the lack of market appetite for developing additional transmission capacities and the decarbonisation objectives. Less than half of these are assessed by ENTSOG in the TYNDP framework. As regards the sustainability assessment of projects, although progress in observed in this TYNDP, there is room to refine it further in the future.

ENTSOG should consider ways to increase stakeholders' interest and engagement in the TYNDP development process, in view of the low number of responses (9) received during its public consultation.

ACER identifies 4 main shortcomings:

  1. Lack of proper analysis of the existing and forecasted use of gas infrastructure as critical criterion to take into account when analysing the need of additional gas infrastructure.

  2. Shortcomings in the applied methodologies, such as a lack of a complete quantitative needs assessment and doubtful quality of the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) methodology and its application which still requires improvement to demonstrate benefits exceed costs so that each individual gas project contributes to sustainability.

  3. The asymmetric treatment of candidate projects depending on whether the projects are intending to apply for Project of Common Interest (PCI) selection or not. ACER expects ENTSOG to apply project-specific cost-benefit analysis for all projects, the same way it is done for the electricity.

  4. Shortcomings in the public consultations of the scenarios methodology and the needs methodology.

In ACER's Opinion the draft gas TYNDP 2020 does not sufficiently contribute to the objectives of non-discrimination and efficient functioning of the market.

What does ACER recommend for improving future gas TYNDPs?

ACER is of the view that improvements in European infrastructure planning are feasible. ACER encourages the ENTSOs to address the remaining shortcomings and stands ready to provide guidance or clarifications where needed. ACER proposes several recommendations to ENTSOG in pursuit of an efficient, further integrated and transparent network planning at the service of consumers, decarbonisation, and sector integration ambitions:

For the Final Gas TYNDP 2020

  • Consider the National Regulatory Authority's (NRA's) comments on the TYNDP 2020 projects

  • Provide a feedback document on how the Public Consultation and ACER's Opinion have been taken into account

  • Classify the energy transition projects into gas supply/ production projects and network related investments

  • Complete information related to project CBA assessments

  • Update information on projects' status by end of year 2020

For the Gas TYNDP 2022 and beyond

  • Implement ACER's recommendations on scenarios

  • Improve planning process to avoid recurring delays, by publishing next TYNDP by mid-2022

  • Incorporate the market perspective on infrastructure gaps

  • Improve the implementation of CBA methodology

  • Include a number of “conventional" gas infrastructure projects commensurate to the assessed needs, by flagging and filtering out unrealistic projects during the data collection stage

  • Roll out modelling tools allowing for sector-integrated assessments of electricity and gas projects

  • Provide the same (maximum) level of cost transparency for all TYNDP regulated projects

  • More attention focused on adaptations of gas infrastructure for the injection of higher shares of renewable, low carbon and de-carbonised gases (hydrogen, synthetic methane, and bio-methane)

  • Together with ENTSO-E, identify suitable locations for power-to-gas installations in the system needs analysis

  • Factor the level of utilisation and congestion of existing infrastructure in the needs assessment

  • Consider ways of covering methane emissions associated with gas infrastructure

What is the TYNDP?

Every two years, ENTSOG publishes a non-binding TYNDP which looks forward over a ten-year horizon and includes a European supply adequacy outlook for natural gas. TYNDPs are essential for assessing and identifying the need of new infrastructure projects to ensure an adequate level of security of gas supply, market integration and competition. The TYNDP must be consistent with National Development Plans (NDPs) and should take into account the energy policy objective of decarbonisation under the European Green Deal.

Projects of Common Interest (PCIs) are selected from the TYNDP via a separate process led by the European Commission. The TYNDP should provide essential and comprehensive information for the selection of PCIs, in particular through complete, monetised, and reliable cost-benefit analysis (CBA) and a sustainability assessment of projects.

What is the role of ACER and its overall assessment?

ACER monitors the development and execution of the plan, and issues an opinion on the draft TYNDP taking into account the objectives of non-discrimination, effective competition, and the efficient and secure functioning of the internal gas market. ACER also looks to the alignment of the plan with broader energy transition and decarbonisation goals.

Online Webinar on the results of the methodological study on barriers to competitive electricity markets

Online Webinar on the results of the methodological study on barriers to competitive electricity markets

What is the event about?

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Banner ACER Webinar 20 May 2021

ACER organises this online webinar to present the results of the methodological study aimed at identifying and measuring barriers to the development of competitive electricity prices and the entry and participation of new market players in the EU electricity wholesale markets.

 

Access the webinar's Agenda.

Registration is closed, as the event reached its full capacity.

The study – which has been carried out with the support of a consultant over several months – will enable ACER to fulfil effectively its new monitoring responsibilities set in the Clean Energy Package. In particular, the study has defined some indicators to be progressively included in future editions of ACER's Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Natural Gas Markets (the so called Market Monitoring Report​).

This study has benefited from inputs collected from a wide range of stakeholders through a public consultation and some interviews. In this webinar, stakeholders will get information about the barriers identified, the indicators to measure them and the methodology to combine these indicators. ​

ACER publishes updated guidance to facilitate REMIT transaction reporting

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ACER publishes updated guidance to facilitate REMIT transaction reporting

What is it about?

Following a six-month consultation with stakeholders and with the objective to contribute to the improvement of REMIT data reporting, ACER published updated REMIT guidance.

It comprises a new version of Annex II of the Transaction Reporting User Manual (TRUM) and of Annex VII of the Manual of Procedures on data reporting, as well as the updated frequently asked questions (FAQs) on transaction reporting and on fundamental data and inside information.

Annex II of TRUM describes several examples of transaction reporting (including orders to trade) related to contracts reportable to ACER, pursuant to the REMIT Implementing Regulation.

More specifically this new publication aims to:

  • ensure consistency with the TRUM (main text) v.4.0 published in June 2020
  • reflect the market design evolution by adding new examples on market coupling
  • include additional examples based on ACER's analysis and the interaction with NRAs and stakeholders.

​Consulted stakeholders include associations of market participants, organised market places, and registered reporting mechanisms.

Access the new version of Annex II of the Transaction Reporting User Manual.

ACER also published ​the updated Annex VII of the Manual of Procedures (MoP) on Data Reporting, describing data fields for inside information and the new electronic formats for reporting. The changes reflect the results of the ACER's Public Consultation on the revision of electronic formats.​

Finally, ACER published the 12th edition of the FAQs on REMIT transaction reporting and the 7th edition of the FAQs on fundamental data and inside information, which include new frequently asked questions to better reflect the continuous evolution of EU markets and facilitate data reporting.

Find the new versions of the FAQ documents on the REMIT Portal.

ACER publicly consults on its proposal for a Framework Guideline to establish a Network Code on Cybersecurity

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ACER publicly consults on its proposal for a Framework Guideline to establish a Network Code on Cybersecurity

What is this ACER public consultation on cyber security about?

Today, the European Union Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) has opened a public consultation on its draft Framework Guideline on sector-specific rules for cybersecurity aspects of cross-border electricity flows, inviting stakeholders to share their views on the document ahead of its submission to the European Commission.

The non-binding Framework Guidelines will set out clear and objective principles for the development of a binding Cybersecurity Network Code that will contribute to maintain the security of the electricity system across Europe.  As such, the proposed Framework Guideline covers various security-related topics for the electricity sector, such as cross-border risk management, harmonized minimum cybersecurity, information sharing, incident handling and crisis management.

The public consul​tation will run from 30th April ​until 29th June 2021​.

To learn more and submit your views, visit the P​ublic Consultation webpage​.

Upcoming webinar​: ACER will also organise a workshop to introduce and explain the content of the proposed Framework Guideline in May 2021. More information will be published soon on the  ACER​​ website.

Background information

The Electricity Market Regulation provides the legal basis for the establishment of cybersecurity rules in the context of cross-border electricity flows. On 28 January 2021, the European Commission invited ACER to draft the Framework Guidelines for a Network Code on Cybersecurity.

EU gas supply sourcing costs fell to record low in 2020 due mainly to COVID-19 gas demand reductions and record LNG deliveries

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EU gas supply sourcing costs fell to record low in 2020 due mainly to COVID-19 gas demand reductions and record LNG deliveries

What is ACER's preliminary assessment of gas supply sourcing costs about?

Average gas supply sourcing costs declined in 2020 in most EU Member States and the Energy Community Contracting Parties by more than 4 Euros/MWh year on year, according to today's preliminary assessment of the EU Agency for the Cooperation for Energy Regulators (ACER) and the Energy Community. When comparing gas sourcing costs in 2020 to their average between 2012-2019, prices declined by 8 Euros/MWh.
The assessment measures the average yearly price at which nationwide suppliers can source their wholesale gas. The calculation considers the prices of products traded at the national hubs as well as declared cross-border gas imports and domestically produced gas.
 

The main drivers of the price decline were the demand reduction caused by COVID-19 and the highest-ever liquefied natural gas (LNG) deliveries registered during the first half of 2020. These resulted in historically low EU hub spot prices in the second quarter of 2020. The decline in the prices of other energy commodities and the above average underground storage stocks at the beginning of the injection season were other contributing factors. Even though hub prices partly recovered from the third quarter, average yearly supply sourcing costs reached their record low since ACER started to assess them in 2012.

Convergence in sourcing prices remained overall robust amongst a majority of Member States, with the largest differences rounding about 3 Euros/MWh. This demonstrates the benefits of the Internal Gas Market. For example, in 2013 sourcing cost spreads of more than 5 Euros/MWh were frequent, implying extra yearly expenditure from 40 to 60 Euros for the average final household consumers in higher costing gas markets. Increased convergence in gas sourcing cost is estimated to have yielded​ average annual welfare gains in the range of 3 billion Euros for EU gas consumers since 2013.​

Full map gas supply costs

Source: ACER and Energy Community calculation based on Eurostat Comext, ICIS Heren and National Regulatory Authorities.

Note: Gas sourcing cost within a given Member State vary per shipper and supply period, shaped by the features of the various contracts, hedging strategies as well as distinct supply origins. To infer an average yearly gas supply price, the Agency uses a methodology that considers three main types of sourcing costs (see MMR 2015, Annex 6): i) based on an explicit basket of hub products (in markets with sufficient forward transactional activity), ii) based on declared cross-border imports and iii) based on domestic production prices. The map displays the arithmetic average of all sourcing mechanisms; the report will contain the exact price estimates per supply mechanism.

Despite the impact of COVID-19 on gas demand and the enhanced availability of liquefied gas, the average gas price did not decline uniformly across the EU. This resulted in some price gaps between the Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) hub-based benchmark and the sourcing costs of some Member States. Prices were higher on average at Member States with a higher reliance on long-term supply contracts indexed either to oil or longer-curve' hub products. The highest average sourcing costs were reported in Southern East, Mediterranean and some Central East Member States. All Baltic countries (excluding Finland), and also Greece, reported very price-competitive import prices in 2020. ACER considers that in both cases this is due to the larger relative indexation to hub prompt products in their more recent LNG supply contracts.

Sourcing costs at the Energy Community Contracting Parties were uneven, shaped by the characteristics of the diverse markets. In the majority of them, gas prices continued to be somewhat higher than for the average of EU Member States due to a prevalence of less favourable long-term contracts and more limited upstream supply competition. However for example in Ukraine the price gap have lessened following market reforms that have made import prices more correlated with EU hubs. Ukraine retains also ample cost-competitive domestic gas production.

In a related exercise, the upcoming 2020 ACER Gas Wholesale Market Monitoring Report will analyse the level of price convergence of spot products traded at EU hubs. The preliminary results indicate a strong price alignment across the North West European region, where price differences against the TTF benchmark remained below 1 Euro/MWh for almost all trading days, as the figure below illustrates. Hub spreads commonly remain below transportation costs despite the gradual expiration of long-term capacity contracts, which is reducing in turn EU shippers' short-run marginal costs bidding (the Market Monitoring Report will analyse this trend in depth). Record liquefied gas deliveries and flexible North Sea supplies, together with the structural fostering of hub trading at the region, are deemed as limiting price decoupling.

While hub price convergence tends to be stronger at regional level, Central and South Eastern hubs, as well as Mediterranean and Baltic ones, still show some higher spreads when comparing against the TTF benchmark. Those differences arise because of higher transportation tariffs as well as from the specific interplay of marginal supply and opportunity pricing at the individual markets.  Nonetheless, overall, spot price alignment increased year on year with lower demand combined with high liquefied gas deliveries and storage stocks. The improvement was notable at the Hungarian, Italian and Spanish hubs. For example, unusually, the Italian hub quoted at a discount to the Austrian hub across the summer months, on the grounds of extra liquefied gas deliveries.

2020 TTF convergence V3

Sourcing costs and hub price individual assessments will be further examined in the next edition of the Gas Wholesale Market Monitoring Report, to be published in July 2021. Furthermore, the report will focus on presenting the results of the ACER Gas Target Model metrics for the year 2020 as well as on assessing the effects of gas network codes implementation. It will include a new chapter identifying the contributions that the gas sector can make to the EU decarbonisation ambitions. 

Open Call

Open Call

Open call for Gas Capacity Booking Platforms to submit offers for Mallnow and GCP

The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) calls for the submission of offers to select a web-based capacity booking platform to be used by transmission system operators (TSOs) for the offering of bundled gas capacity products at the Mallnow physical interconnection point (IP) and the GCP virtual interconnection point (VIP) between Germany and Poland.
Capacity booking platforms that are active in the European Union and fulfil the requirements of the EU Regulation establishing a Network Code on Capacity Allocation Mechanisms can submit their offers until noon, 7 June 2019. All capacity booking platforms fulfilling the requirements of Article 37(1) and (2) of the NC CAM are invited to participate.
Following the receipt and the evaluation of the offers, the Agency will decide which capacity booking platform shall perform the capacity allocations for the above-mentioned IPs for a period no longer than three years.

Our vision: a competitive, secure European gas market that benefits all consumers

Our vision: a competitive, secure European gas market that benefits all consumers

A bridge to 2025

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​​​In the “Bridge to 2025”, regulators set out their thinking on the key challenges and the possible responses to secure the appropriate regulatory framework for the coming decade. The present document renews and updates the Gas Target Model (GTM) developed in 2011. The core principles that underpin our vision for European gas markets will remain the same today as when the GTM was first published. This vision is of a competitive European gas market, comprising entry-exit zones with liquid virtual trading points, where market integration is served by appropriate levels of infrastructure, which is utilised efficiently and enables gas to move freely between market areas to the locations where it is most highly valued by gas market participants. However, the European gas market and the uncertainties and challenges it faces have changed fundamentally, and this requires a new mind set in order to adopt the correct regulatory approach when looking forward to the next decade. You can have a look at the latest GTM here.  

The Network Codes will bring Europe closer to this vision. Implementing them in full and on schedule is the right priority and the focus for regulators and other stakeholders today. However, the Network Codes alone are unlikely to deliver a “well-functioning transparent gas wholesale … market” that benefits consumers across Europe, as required by Regulation (EC) No 715/2009. Consequently, this revised GTM not only guides the coherent development and implementation of the Network Codes, but also specifies the steps required to realise liquid and dynamic gas markets thereby enabling all European consumers to benefit from secure gas supplies and effective retail competition.    

Increasing uncertainty in supply and demand     

An important factor in revising the GTM has been changing gas market dynamics. The supply and demand picture has become increasingly uncertain in recent years. For a long period, gas demand had been rising relentlessly. A combination of factors has changed that. In particular, the shale gas revolution in America has put gas-intensive European industrial enterprises at a competitive disadvantage. At the same time, the coal displaced from the American generation mix has lowered coal prices in Europe such that coal-fired generation is now far more profitable than running gas-fired power stations. The low emission allowance price has also exacerbated this phenomenon. On the supply side, European Union (EU) production, which is located largely in the UK and the Netherlands, is declining. Whilst unconventional gas production will be a positive development as far as domestic output is concerned, it is unlikely to have a significant impact on gas supplies, even in the most optimistic scenarios, until well into the 2020s.    

Competitive markets ensure Security of Supply    ​

Security of Supply and competition work in concert; the more pluralistic upstream supply is in Europe, the less we will depend on any one source of supply that may be subject to either physical restrictions or political interference. Our research shows that thirteen Member States do not meet the original GTM target of a Residual Supply Index (RSI) of over 110% of demand, whilst most Eastern European countries cannot currently hit this target.     

The GTM strongly affirms that well-functioning gas markets remain essential providers of supply security. Building on the original GTM, we recommend further enhancements to market-based measures, such as ensuring that imbalance prices remain dynamic throughout an emergency, with no cap on prices (up to the value of lost load, or VoLL), in order to strengthen incentives for market participants (including storage users) to deliver supply security. In addition, we propose full unbundling of storage products and setting appropriate network tariffs for storage users. We note that it can be difficult to give Transmission System Operators (TSOs) incentives to work together to build large, complex projects from relatively distant regions (and such projects are often unable to access capital markets). Relevant public bodies should give priority status to such infrastructure investments and be able to promote them as projects of common interest (PCIs).    
 

Wholesale market functioning    ​

The GTM interprets the Gas Regulation requirement of “facilitating the emergence of a well-functioning and transparent wholesale market” as implying a liquid spot market and, crucially, a liquid wholesale forward and/or futures market, so that cost-effective wholesale market risk management is possible. For example, this means that a new entrant can sell a fixed-price contract to a consumer for delivery of gas in a year’s time, and in turn purchase the required gas at a fixed price in the wholesale gas market. Research we have undertaken shows that forward trading is highly limited across the EU. This point is of critical importance.     

Interconnections have a key role to play in achieving a functioning EU market. The Capacity Allocation (CAM) Network Code and the Congestion Management Procedures (CMP) Guidelines represent a fundamental step forward, but are not sufficient in many cases. The updated GTM therefore includes an assessment of the functioning of wholesale markets at national level, developing a revised series of metrics to assess whether a wholesale market is ‘well-functioning’. These metrics are based on the analysis of data and information not available when the first GTM was drafted and can be grouped into two key characteristics of markets:    

  1. They meet market participants’ needs: products and liquidity are available that enable effective management of wholesale market risk; and,   

  2. They have “market health”: the wholesale market is demonstrably competitive, resilient and has a high degree of Security of Supply.    

The self-evaluation process    ​

We propose that all Member States assess whether they are likely to meet, or continue to meet, these revised GTM metrics by 2017 (and every three years thereafter) in order to determine whether their market will be well functioning. If it will not, the GTM suggests considering structural market reforms. Three market integration tools have been identified (this list is not exhaustive):    

  1. Full market merger: full merger of two or more adjacent markets by merging their virtual trading points and balancing zones;     

  2. Trading region: partial merger of two or more adjacent markets at the wholesale level by merging their virtual trading points and establishing a cross-border trading balancing zone; and,    

  3. Satellite market: substantial linking (via pipeline capacity) of a non-functioning gas market to a directly neighbouring, well-functioning wholesale gas market.    

Additional tools, including market coupling, can have a beneficial effect by facilitating coordinated, simultaneous access to capacity and spot gas markets.    

Any reforms undertaken by Member States should be based on an appropriate cost-benefit analysis to ensure their economic viability.   

The role of gas in complementing renewable energy source generation  

We believe that more can, and should, be done to ensure that regulatory and market arrangements allow for more efficient use of gas-fired power plants. We predict that significant gas-fired generating capacity is likely to be needed to provide flexible back up to renewable energy sources (RES) whilst also running at a far lower load factor than was previously the case. To optimise the joint working of the electricity and gas sectors, we propose that gas and electricity TSOs should be legally obliged to cooperate with one another. This could include: (i) improved information flows so that system operators and market participants benefit from more timely information, allowing all parties to make more optimised operational decisions; and, (ii) a cooperative review of gas and electricity industry timelines, among other things.    

New developments in the gas supply chain 

We have also considered new developments in the use of gas. These include: (i) the intensification of gas use in the transportation sector (in both liquefied (LNG) and compressed natural gas (CNG) forms); (ii) small-scale applications of LNG and CNG, including alternative means of distribution such as virtual pipelines; and, (iii) pioneering technologies that facilitate the storage of electricity in the form of hydrogen or synthetic gas (“power to gas” or P2G).    

As regulators, it is important that we facilitate the emergence of these new uses of gas through appropriate and limited interventions only. The areas we have considered in our review include:    

Clarification as to which of these activities require regulatory intervention (in particular loading/bunkering activities at LNG storage facilities);    

Ensuring that LNG and CNG filling stations are not considered as suppliers of gas, and consequently should not be subject to third party access (TPA) or licensing procedures;    

Facilitating a level-playing field between piped and non-piped supplies, so that gas-to-gas competition is possible if the market demands it; and,    

Particularly in the case of P2G, the technical provisions for injecting hydrogen and synthetic gas in the gas system, the pricing regime, the role of the P2G operators, the balancing aspect and integration in the electricity system.   ​

Conclusion    

​Our 2014 Market Monitoring Report estimated that insufficient interconnection of wholesale gas markets led to a gross-welfare loss of approximately EUR 7 billion in 2013. The implication is that functioning European gas markets which meet the needs of EU gas consumers are the exception rather than the rule in 2014, when the internal energy market was due to be completed. Security of gas supplies is again the focus for policymakers across the EU and the costs of dependence on a single supplier have again been made clear. This revised GTM identifies how Europe can realise its potential and reap the vast benefits of a secure, fully implemented internal gas market for all its citizens.   

Methodologies

Methodologies

Methodologies and indicators

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The analysis included in the Agency's market monitoring reports rely on methodologies and indicators, which are elaborated and debated with national regulators, the European Commission and other relevant stakeholders.​​

Methodologies

Electricity Wholesale Markets

To facilitate its reading, the most relevant monitoring methodologies used across the Electricity Wholesale Markets Volume have been compiled into a set of 'methodological papers', which are cross-referenced in the relevant chapters where those methodologies are applied.