The fine imposed on Energi Danmark A/S (Energi Danmark) is based on a report made by the Danish energy regulatory authority (Danish Utility Regulator, DUR) in March 2024, which was referred to the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic and International Crime. 

This penalty comes under the REMIT Regulation (EU) No 1227/2011, which prohibits market manipulation and seeks to protect the integrity and transparency of the EU’s wholesale energy markets.

According to energy regulator (DUR) and the Danish state prosecutor, the misconduct, which took place on 3 January 2020, included five cases of electricity market manipulation and one attempt to do so in violation of Article 5 of REMIT. Through its behaviour, called 'cross-zonal capacity hoarding', the company acquired all, or a significant share of, the capacity available on an electricity transmission connection between two bidding areas by trading with itself. In this way, Energi Danmark prevented other market participants from using the capacity, thereby creating or increasing a price difference between the two bidding areas. 

DUR estimated the financial gain from the conduct at DKK 80,693 (approximately EUR 10,800). The prosecutor fined Energi Danmark 380,000 DKK (approximately EUR 50,900), which Energi Danmark has accepted to pay. 

In December 2018, Energi Danmark had already agreed to pay a fine of DKK 750,000 (approximately EUR 100,500) for violating the same REMIT regulation prohibition of market manipulation, which DUR emphasised as an aggravating circumstance in its report. 

The EU Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) welcomes this third decision related to the hoarding of cross-border electricity transmission capacity in Denmark. ACER emphasises the importance of vigorous enforcement to enhance public trust in the EU’s electricity markets and protect European consumers from market abuse.

Access DUR’s press release (in Danish).

Access ACER’s Guidance Note on cross-zonal capacity hoarding. Also check the ACER REMIT Guidance (6.1^st edition) for more information on the types of trading practices which could constitute market manipulation under REMIT.

See the latest table of REMIT breach sanction decisions adopted by national regulatory authorities.

Interested in further information on enforcement decisions under REMIT? Check out ACER’s REMIT Quarterly reports.

Peak-shaving products are market-based tools that enable market participants to reduce their electricity consumption during peak demand periods in exchange for compensation.

Under the 2024 Electricity Market Design (EMD) Regulation, the Council can declare a regional or EU-wide electricity crisis if wholesale prices become excessively high. In such cases, Member States can instruct system operators to use peak-shaving products to reduce power demand, helping to stabilise the grid and lower prices.

ACER assessment

The EMD Regulation mandates ACER to assess the potential impact of developing peak-shaving products on the EU’s electricity market under normal market conditions. This assessment should also evaluate whether these products can be introduced without disrupting the functioning of electricity markets or redirecting demand response services towards peak-shaving products.

In February 2025, ACER established an Expert Group to provide guidance on the topic. To further strengthen this assessment, ACER will gather inputs from stakeholders through a public consultation from 20 March 2025 until 17 April 2025. 

Next steps

Based on the findings of ACER’s assessment (expected in summer 2025), the European Commission may propose amendments to the Electricity Regulation to introduce peak-shaving products beyond electricity price crisis situations. 

On 31 January 2025, ACER received a proposal from the Nominated Electricity Market Operators (NEMOs) for the Market Coupling Operation (MCO) integration plan.

What is the MCO integration plan?

The MCO integration plan aims to integrate NEMOs from Energy Community countries into the EU’s electricity day-ahead and intraday market coupling system. To achieve this, the plan should include:

• a detailed explanation of how the integration will work;
• a proposed timeline for implementation; and
• an assessment of how the integration may impact MCO functions.

The plan should also align with the existing MCO framework, which defines how EU NEMOs collaborate to establish and perform MCO functions (e.g. market coupling operations, algorithm management, capacity data processing), needed to ensure that electricity markets across countries operate efficiently.

Why is a decision needed?

The Capacity Allocation and Congestion Management Regulation, as adapted and adopted for the Energy Community, requires all NEMOs to submit a proposal for the MCO integration plan to ACER, regulatory authorities and the Energy Community Regulatory Board.

ACER is responsible for reviewing and approving the plan, ensuring it aligns with the EU electricity market framework.

What are the next steps?

ACER expects to decide on the MCO integration plan by July 2025.

Contact information 

Interested parties may contact ACER on this matter at ACER-ELE-2025-001@acer.europa.eu by 31 March 2025 at the latest.

Relevant documents

All NEMOs' proposal for the MCO integration plan.

Explanatory note.

Today, ACER releases its report on the Swedish gas transmission tariff directed at the Swedish National Regulatory Authority (NRA), Energimarknadsinspektionen (Ei), and Transmission System Operator, Swedegas.

The report assesses whether the proposed Reference Price Methodology (RPM) complies with the requirements of the Network Code on Harmonised Transmission Tariff structures (NC TAR). 

What are the key findings? 

After analysing the consultation document, ACER concludes that:

• Most of the required information is provided, however, the forecasted contracted capacity, tariff comparison between periods, and detailed information on some non-transmission services are missing. 

• The input parameters of the proposed RPM do not fulfil the transparency requirements of the NC TAR. As a result, ACER concludes that the proposed RPM is not fully compliant with the transparency principle.

• While the choice of the postage stamp methodology is well justified, limitations identified in the allowed revenue estimation and revenue reconciliation raise concerns about the cost reflectivity of the proposed tariff. Consequently, ACER cannot conclude that the proposed RPM complies with the cost-reflectivity principle. 

• The proposed RPM achieves a reasonable level of cross-subsidisation compared to the alternative capacity-weighted distance methodology while complying with the principles of non-discrimination, volume risk, and the prevention of distortions in cross-border trade. 

• The information provided on the three non-transmission services (fees for extra area consumption, capacity allocation for summer and winter periods, and capacity allocation for daily capacity products) is insufficient to assess the compliance with the NC TAR principles.

What does ACER recommend? 

ACER recommends that the NRA, when adopting its decision:

• Includes the missing elements and clarifies inconsistencies in the calculation of input parameters for the tariff-setting process, ensuring stakeholders fully understand the methodology. 

• Specifies the start of the regulatory period for the proposed RPM and the applicability of the consulted tariff.

• Provides the missing information on the three additional non-transmission services. 

ACER welcomes the steps taken by the NRA to realign the allowed revenue with Article 17 of Renewable Gas, Natural Gas and Hydrogen Regulation, ensuring it reflects the TSO’s actual costs, as long as they correspond to those of an efficient and structurally comparable network operator. 

Additionally, ACER appreciates that the TSO and NRA followed its recommendation in the 2024 tariff report and conducted another consultation on the applied methodology. 

See all ACER reports on the national tariff consultation documents.

Today, ACER releases its Opinion on the National Resource Adequacy Assessment of Poland. This is the second ACER Opinion on a National Resource Adequacy Assessment (NRAA).

What is a resource adequacy assessment?

The European Resource Adequacy Assessment (ERAA) evaluates electricity resource adequacy across the EU and provides an objective framework to assess the need for additional national measures to ensure security of supply. ERAA is carried out annually by the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) and reviewed by ACER.

Member States can complement the European analysis with their own national assessments (NRAAs). While the latter follow the ERAA methodology, they may capture new developments or national specificities that have not been reflected in the latest ERAA.

When a national assessment identifies new adequacy concerns, and the Member State informs ACER, ACER must issue an Opinion on the differences between the national and European assessments.

What are ACER’s findings?

In its Opinion, ACER identified three main differences between the Polish NRAA and ERAA.

ACER finds that Poland’s assessment:

• Updates assumptions on capacity resources, for example, by using revised estimates for nuclear and renewable energy capacity.
• Introduces additional modelling elements, e.g. thoroughly assessing the economics of capacity resources by analysing their revenues and costs. However, it does not fully account for the development of demand response and battery storage in the Polish market.
• Does not adequately consider the interconnected nature of Europe’s electricity market, as:
  • the country’s maximum import capacity indicated in the NRAA is more constrained than in practice (as shown in the figure below); and
  • exports are not considered.

This simplification does not highlight the benefits of cross-border electricity exchanges, which help reduce overall system costs and improve adequacy.

The figure compares the import (1.8 GW) and export (0 GW) limits in the Polish NRAA (yellow) with Poland's actual net import in 2023 (blue, where a positive value indicates net import).

ACER also notes that some issues (and their potential effects) identified in Poland’s NRAA were already observed in other monitoring activities:

• The Polish Transmission System Operator (TSO) applies “allocation constraints” (i.e. temporary measures foreseen by the regulation). In its report on cross-zonal capacities (July 2024), ACER found that these constraints occasionally limit electricity exports from Poland, even when its neighbours are in need. This has a stronger impact during Dunkelflaute events, i.e. when renewable energy production is reduced due to weather conditions. As a result, Poland’s electricity prices do not reflect regional shortages effectively, limiting earnings for local generators and demand response providers (see figure below).
• In its report on barriers to demand-side flexibility (December 2023), ACER found several barriers to demand response and other distributed resources in Poland. Addressing these barriers would facilitate the uptake of these resources, helping to alleviate concerns that might otherwise justify extending the existing capacity mechanism.

During a dunkelflaute event on 12 December 2024 at 16:00-17:00, the electricity price in Poland (165 euros/MWh) was several times lower than in its neighbouring countries. Source: ACER based on ENTSO-E Transparency Platform.

What are the next steps?

ACER recommends that the Polish Ministry of Climate and Environment and the Polish TSO take these findings into account and, if necessary, revise the NRAA.

This would improve the robustness of the Polish assessment and provide a more accurate picture of the country’s electricity adequacy. 

On 16 August 2024, the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) of the Netherlands asked ACER to decide on how to address insufficient risk hedging opportunities at the bidding zone border between the Netherlands and Norway (NL-NO2).

After consulting with stakeholders in autumn 2024 and assessing the potential impact of long-term transmission rights (LTTRs) on the NL-NO2 bidding zone border, ACER has now issued its Decision 02-2025.

Why was a decision needed?

The assessments performed by the Dutch and Norwegian NRAs found insufficient opportunities to hedge electricity prices in their respective bidding zones. Sufficient long-term hedging opportunities are important for market participants to hedge against price volatility and to mitigate uncertainty on future investment returns.

To address this issue, national regulators can request their Transmission System Operators (TSOs) to:

• Issue long-term transmission rights (LTTRs); or
• Ensure the availability of other long-term cross-zonal hedging products that can support the functioning of the wholesale electricity market.

Since the Dutch and Norwegian regulators could not reach an agreement, the decision was referred to ACER and the EFTA Surveillance Authority.

What are long-term transmission rights?

Long-term transmission rights are cross-border hedging tools provided by TSOs, enabling market players to manage price differences between bidding zones and reduce financial risks.

What did ACER decide?

ACER decided against the introduction of long-term transmission rights on the NL-NO2 bidding zone border. ACER’s assessment showed that:

• LTTRs would offer limited improvements to hedging opportunities in the Dutch and NO2 bidding zones;
• Financial LTTRs on this border would likely be undervalued, resulting in higher costs for consumers.

For this reason, ACER has asked the Dutch TSO to explore alternative measures to address insufficient hedging opportunities in these bidding zones.

The EFTA Surveillance Authority will issue a decision for Norway, following the procedure outlined in the EEA Agreement.

What are the next steps?

The Dutch TSO has six months to submit an alternative proposal to its NRA, outlining arrangements to improve hedging opportunities in these bidding zones.